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A B S T R A C T
The pressures of economic crisis and reform that have gripped African societies
have been accompanied by a proliferation of new religious movements. Amid
concerns about the political impact of religious revivalism, little attention has
been devoted to their economic implications. Focusing on the remarkable co-
incidence between the withdrawal of the state, the rise of religious movements,
and the dramatic expansion of the informal economy, this paper examines the
role of religious revivalism in processes of informal economic governance and
class formation in contemporary Africa. Against the background of the historical
role of religion in the development of market institutions across the continent, it
traces the dynamics of religious revivalism and informal economic regulation in
two regions of Nigeria. Rather than representing a return to occultist or patri-
monial impulses, new religious movements reveal distinctly Weberian tendencies.
However, modernising tendencies fostered within the informal economy by
popular religious revivalism are being stunted by the relentless pressures of lib-
eralisation, globalisation and pseudo-democratisation. Progressive religious tend-
encies among the poor are being instrumentalised by religious entrepreneurs and
political elites, undermining fragile processes of entrepreneurial class formation
taking place within the informal economy.
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Africa has been hit by a wave of religious revivalism, the implications of
which social scientists and politicians are still struggling to understand.
The challenges of economic crisis and structural adjustment programmes
that gripped the continent from the late 1970s have been accompanied by
a dramatic proliferation of ‘ fundamentalist ’ religious movements, both
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Christian and Islamic. In the past three decades, Christian revivalism has
grown from a handful of charismatic churches to over 10,000 pente-
costalist churches and groups across Africa (Giﬀord 1998; Ojo 2005: 397).
This religious awakening has fostered an expansion of global religious
networks linking African churches to pentecostalist groups in the United
States and Europe. Over the same period, reformist Islamic movements
have begun to develop mass followings in East and West Africa (Loimeier
2005; Menkhaus 2002; Villalon 1999), amid growing cultural and ﬁnancial
linkages between African Islamic activists and Saudi Arabia, the Gulf
States, Libya and Iran. With the rise of international concern about the
‘clash of civilisations ’, these developments have raised new questions
about the relationship between globalisation, religion and politics in
Africa.
Much less attention has been devoted to the economic dimensions of
this process, which have signiﬁcant, but distinct, implications for our
understanding of political change in contemporary Africa. As David
Maxwell (1998: 350) noted in an incisive article on pentecostalism in
Zimbabwe: ‘ the debate, deriving fromMaxWeber … over how much the
Protestant ethic inﬂuenced, and was inﬂuenced by, the spirit of capi-
talism … hardly engages at all with the third wave of Pentecostalist
Protestantism’. He points out that studies of pentecostalism have tended to
focus on their contribution to democracy or civil society, while ignoring
the critical economic dimension of their inﬂuence on social and political
mobilisation: ‘The growing inﬂuence of what is known as the ‘‘prosperity
gospel ’’ has implications for both the formation of capitalist attitudes and
activities, and for shaping political activism.’ A recent issue of The Review of
African Political Economy on religion in contemporary Africa hints at the role
of new religious movements in class formation and challenges to failed
authority, and ﬁnds evidence of protestant as well as patrimonial and
occultist ethics in various parts of Africa (see articles by Hasu 2006; Ifeka
2006; Love 2006; Obadare 2006). Studies of West Africa have noted
a signiﬁcant economic dimension in recent Islamic movements, which
encourage new ethics of frugality and educational attainment in the face of
economic crisis and state withdrawal (Babou 2002; Labazee 1995; Villalon
1999). Already in the mid 1990s, Pascale Labaze´e (1995: 150) noted that the
new anti-Suﬁ Islamic movements in Nigeria, Niger and Senegal propa-
gated an ethic of parsimony which is distinct from the redistributive ethic
of Suﬁsm, and addresses the needs of lower-middle-class groups and small
traders struggling with falling real incomes and narrow trading margins.
Ellis and ter Haar (2004b: 11) have remarked in passing that Christian and
Islamic religious networks also play a central role in the expansion of
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global remittances to Africa. Despite these various indications of the
economic signiﬁcance of contemporary African religious movements,
the implications of these processes for emerging forms of governance on
the continent have not been systematically explored.
The result has been a lack of serious attention to the remarkable co-
incidence between the withdrawal of the state, the proliferation of religious
movements, and the dramatic expansion of the informal economy.
Weakened states and crumbling formal institutions have triggered an ex-
plosion of informal economic activity across Africa. By the turn of the
millennium, World Bank and ILO sources put Africa’s informal economy
at 42% of GDP, 78% of the non-agricultural labour force, and 93% of
new employment, giving Africa the dubious distinction of being the most
informalised region in the world (Schneider 2002; ILO 2002). This not
only makes informal actors an important political constituency in the era
of democratisation, but raises important questions about the alternative
forms of governance through which this enormous informal economy ﬁlls
the regulatory gaps left by contracting, and in some cases collapsing,
states. As Linda Weiss (1987) pointed out in another context, informal
economies are not sites of atomistic entrepreneurship; they require net-
works of social relations for mobilising labour, credit and trust. While
ethnicity has played a prominent role in organising African informal
economies, religion has, historically and in contemporary times, also been
a critical factor in the organisation of reliable economic networks outside
the framework of the state.
This paper explores the role of religious movements in informal econ-
omic governance in two diﬀerent regions of Nigeria. The analysis focuses
on an informal textile cluster in the Muslim Yoruba city of Ilorin in south-
western Nigeria, and informal shoe and garment manufacturing clusters
in the Christian Igbo city of Aba in south-eastern Nigeria. Located on
opposite sides of the country’s major religious as well as ethnic divides,
these informal enterprise clusters provide an opportunity to examine how
religious movements shape economic strategies and processes of class and
identity formation outside the bounds of state regulation. The empirical
material presented here is a product of ﬁeld research conducted in Aba
in 1999–2000, with subsequent visits in 2001 and 2005; and in Ilorin in
2004–5. Statistical information is based on a survey of 132 shoe and gar-
ment producers and 60 weavers, supplemented by more than 80 in-depth
interviews with informal producers, leaders of informal enterprise associ-
ations, and local government oﬃcials.
The paper begins with a brief examination of the literature on the
economic role of religious movements in Africa, with attention to debates
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about the implications of religious revivalism for promoting or trans-
forming patrimonialism and magical forms of accumulation. Focusing on
the role of religious movements from the late colonial period as well as in
contemporary times, I then trace the implications of conversion to new
religious sects for shaping alternative ethics of economic conduct, new
increasingly global business and marketing networks, and new social ten-
sions. I argue, against some of the prevailing literature, that religious
movements in contemporary Africa are not primarily a return to occultist
or patrimonial impulses, but have also fostered productive economic tend-
encies within society. While patrimonial strategies and occultist behaviour
exist, religious conversion among Nigerian informal artisans reveals a
strong modernising and anti-patrimonial ethic based on social advance-
ment through education, skills and legitimate rather than illicit access to
the power and resources of the state. While a progressive trajectory of
religious governance is emerging within the informal economy, this is
being stunted rather than unleashed by the relentless pressures of liberal-
isation, globalisation and the realities of democratisation in conditions of
economic austerity. In short, neo-liberal economic and political reforms,
rather than African culture, are undermining the spirit of capitalism in
African societies.
U N V E I L I N G T H E I N V I S I B L E : R E L I G I O U S N E T W O R K S
A N D E C O N O M I C C H A N G E I N A F R I C A
Even a cursory look at the informal economy in contemporary Africa
makes it clear that religion plays a signiﬁcant role in the emergence of
new forms of economic order in the context of state decline. Somalia has
played host to an ‘economy without a state ’ for nearly two decades,
heavily supported by ﬂows of remittances, trade and investment through
Islamic hawala networks centred in Dubai (Lindley 2005; Little 2003). In
similar fashion, the Islamic trading networks of the Mouride brotherhoods
of Senegal and the Hausa of Nigeria have responded to economic crisis at
home by globalising their activities, creating transnational trading linkages
that stretch to North America, Europe, the Gulf States and East Asia, as
well as informal remittance ﬂows that are now outstripping the value of
foreign aid in the countries concerned (Babou 2002; Dahou & Fouchard
forthcoming; Ebin 1993; Meagher 2003). A recent IFAD report (2007)
shows that remittance ﬂows to Africa exceed US$38 billion, much of it
through informal channels, amounting to nearly twice the value of current
aid ﬂows to the continent. Globalising pentecostal Christian networks also
play an increasing role in generating new economic opportunities outside
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the framework of the state. From Zimbabwe to Ghana, growing linkages
between African churches and pentecostal communities in the USA and
UK have supported social welfare networks as well as access to resources,
visas, and educational opportunities (Dahou & Fouchard forthcoming;
Giﬀord 1998; Marshall 1998; Mary 2002). As Ellis and ter Haar (1998:
193) recognise, ‘ religious movements are rarely devoid of political im-
plications and … when they do emerge in a country where the state is
unable to fulﬁl its expected functions in regard to the law and public order,
religion can take on a speciﬁc importance’.
Evidence of the positive eﬀects of African informal economic and re-
ligious networks on entrepreneurship and accumulation challenges con-
temporary representations of African informal economies as shadowy
forms of governance steeped in patrimonialism, corruption and super-
stitious belief. The recent expansion of informal economies and religious
movements has triggered alarm among many social scientists of contem-
porary Africa, who appear to share a Weberian mistrust of particularistic
ties and networks which are seen as destructive of rational economic and
political order. In the political economy of informal governance, eﬀorts to
grasp the regulatory implications of globalisation, economic informa-
lisation and religious revivalism have tended to focus more on witchcraft
and human sacriﬁce than on more conventional religious movements.
References to ‘occult economies ’, ‘ shadow governances’ and a cultural
fascination with ‘ the invisible ’ associate African spiritual impulses with an
anti-Weberian ethic that undermines rather than promotes productive
economic change (Bayart 1999, 2005; Chabal & Daloz 1999, 2006;
Comaroﬀ & Comaroﬀ 1999; Ellis & ter Haar 2004a). According to Jean
and John Comaroﬀ (1999: 289), religious revival in Africa and African
diaspora societies involves
an expansion both in techniques of producing value and in the meaning of
wealth itself. It is an expansion that often breaks the conventional bounds of
legality, making crime, as well as magic, a mode of production open to those who
lack other resources. This is why violence, as an instrument of income redistri-
bution, is such a ubiquitous feature of postcolonial economies, in Africa and
beyond.
Similarly, Ellis and ter Haar (2004a) link the production of wealth in
contemporary Africa with occult practices, while Jean-Francois Bayart
(1999: 34) argues that, far from fostering the spirit of capitalism, ‘ the
‘‘ social capital ’’ of Africa appears to display a marked aﬃnity with the
spirit of criminality ’.
While eﬀorts are made to emphasise the modernity of these spiritual
tendencies as responses to global capitalism rather than a reversion to
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primordial practices, such representations of indigenous mechanisms of
economic governance tend to crowd out more progressive and mundane
religious responses to global capitalism and economic hardship. As
Terence Ranger (2004) observes in a review of Ellis and ter Haar’s Worlds
of Power, ‘an account which has too much to say about witchcraft, or about
human sacriﬁce, or trade in body parts and Satanism cannot help but be
an unrepresentative and distorting account ’. Such accounts have tended
to distract attention from more constructive tendencies of African religious
movements, involving new forms of solidarity, entrepreneurial networks
and productive institutional innovation, which play at least as prominent a
role as witchcraft in contemporary spiritual responses to liberalisation
across the continent.
For a more balanced account, one must look beyond the literature on
the political economy of informal governance, to a more varied literature
on the role of new Christian and Islamic movements in the ravaged
regulatory terrain of contemporary African societies. Studies of Islamic as
well as Christian religious networks highlight their role in introducing
strict moral norms, a range of eﬃcient commercial institutions, and a
tendency to operate across communal and class boundaries, contributing
to processes of accumulation and social cohesion in a context of intense
hardship and social disruption. Studies of Nigeria, Tanzania and
Zimbabwe emphasise the role of pentecostal movements in fostering new
ethics of piety, frugality and responsibility that ‘provide a pattern for
coming to terms with, and beneﬁting from, modernities ’ dominant values
and institutions’ (Maxwell 1998: 351). Far from fostering a slide into the
occult, pentecostal churches focus on disembedding believers from
the spiritual and economic pressures of communal obligations, and re-
embedding them in an ethic described by Ruth Marshall (1998: 282) as ‘a
doctrine of morally-controlled materialism’. In a compelling account of
Zimbabwe’s Assemblies of God Church (ZAOGA), David Maxwell (1998:
353) details the speciﬁc institutional processes through which believers are
‘re-socialised’ into a church society that emphasises literacy, moral prob-
ity and industriousness, reintegrating the volatile category of urban youth
into productive forms of social engagement : ‘This re-socialisation makes
the born-again believer more industrious and socially mobile than many
of their unsaved neighbours … ’. Through the ‘doctrine of talents ’, the
church also promotes a local culture of small-scale entrepreneurship
among women through a skills-training and credit system reminiscent of
indigenous apprenticeship systems of West Africa. Matthews Ojo (2005)
and others note the role of West African pentecostal churches in setting up
social welfare networks, sponsoring educational or business activities, and
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linking church members into international networks of solidarity and ad-
vancement (Fouchard et al. 2005; Giﬀord 1998).
The available evidence indicates that reformist Islamic movements have
a similar orientation to personal advancement and ‘the remoralisation of
public life ’ (Fouchard et al. 2005: 344). In Senegal, Villalon (1999) explores
the role of new Islamic movements in constructively channelling the social
and political energies of disaﬀected urban youth. Similarly, the reformist
Izala movement of northern Nigeria promoted an ethic of frugality and
economic advancement through an emphasis on education, modesty and
minimal ceremonial expenditure, which appealed strongly to northern
Nigerian artisans, small traders and aspiring middle classes hard-hit by the
depredations of structural adjustment (Kane 2003; Labazee 1995). In
Somalia, Islamic courts played a central role in the rebuilding of law and
order before the Ethiopian invasion, and were widely supported by a local
business community anxious for a return to security and predictability
(Bradbury et al. 2001; Menkhaus 2007). In addition to their emphasis on
the moral reintegration and rebuilding of society, Islamic and Christian
movements alike also involve a critique of corruption, and a focus on
economic advancement outside prevailing patronage systems (Fouchard
et al. 2005: 344; Maxwell 1998: 365).
Far from being uniquely modern developments, the moralising and
enterprise-promoting tendencies of African religious movements are part
of a longer history in which religious conversion and renewal have
facilitated processes of popular resistance, economic development and
class formation. Religious conversion has long been associated with cre-
ating suitable conditions for accumulation and the formation of more
commercially oriented groups. In pre-colonial West Africa, historians
have traced the contribution of oracular religions and secret societies to
the development of inter-regional markets and long-distance trading net-
works in areas dominated by stateless societies, while conversion to Islam
played a key part in creating a social and economic framework for cross-
cultural trade and accumulation in areas with more centralised forms of
political authority (Austen 1987; Lovejoy 1980; Northrup 1978). The col-
onial period was associated with a range of new religious movements
linked to the rise of new ethics of production and accumulation, such as
the Mouride brotherhoods in Senegal in the late nineteenth century
(Cruise O’Brien 1975), the conversion of Zambian villagers to Jehovah’s
Witness (Long 1968), and Islamic conversion among Giriama palm pro-
ducers in coastal Kenya (Parkin 1972). In each case, religious conversion
provided the ‘religious justiﬁcation, spiritual protection and practical as-
sistance’ for converts to disentangle themselves from the demands of kin,
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and join new moral communities dedicated to accumulation through
commercial farming, shopkeeping and trade (Meagher 2005; Platteau
2000). Neatly capturing the implications of these processes in colonial
Africa, and casting new light on contemporary religious dynamics, the
eminent economist Jean-Philippe Platteau (2000: 226) observed that :
In these new spiritual communities, emphasis is placed on virtues of self-restraint
and consumption moderation (such as abstaining from drinking alcohol and
gambling) and on the need to concomitantly do away with traditional feasts
where lavish expenditures on food, drinks, and other goods are typically in-
curred … In most cases, it is conversion to Islam or Christianity that provides the
necessary escape from community loyalty with all its attendant social obligations.
Far from representing a resurgence of superstition and witchcraft, in-
digenous as well as imported religious movements in many parts of pre-
colonial, colonial and contemporary Africa demonstrate processes of
social and economic realignment that are more Weberian than occult.
This is not to suggest that religious movements are the solution to the
‘crisis of governance’ in contemporary Africa – far from it. Even sym-
pathetic studies have revealed growing problems of authoritarianism and
patrimonial tendencies in both pentecostal and Islamic movements
(Giﬀord 2004; Loimeier 2005; Marshall 1995; Maxwell 1998). In a de-
tailed analysis of pentecostal churches in Ghana, Paul Giﬀord (2004: 188)
argues that the prevailing moral message is neo-patrimonial and inimical
to eﬀective political engagement : ‘Some churches are moving to structure
themselves along the lines of the unchallengeable Big Man rather than
accountable leadership and popular participation. ’ Similarly, the leader-
ship of new Islamic movements in Senegal and northern Nigeria has
shown a disturbing tendency to become tools of elite politics, and to favour
personal enrichment over social transformation (Adeboye 2005; Dahou &
Fouchard forthcoming; Obadare 2006). Moreover, religiously motivated
violence, challenges to state secularism and increases in witchcraft and
occultist practices remain real, though by no means dominant, tendencies
of contemporary religious movements.
In order to understand the implications of these conﬂicting processes of
popular empowerment, patrimonial authoritarianism and occultism, we
need to move beyond tendencies towards what Ruth Marshall calls ‘pol-
itical reductionism’ and ‘symbolic expansionism’, in which the insti-
tutional impact and agency of believers are either ignored or replaced by a
hermeneutics of the occult. Marshall emphasises the importance of a more
institutionally ﬁne-grained focus, not only on leaders and their interaction
with the state, but on the ‘ implicit politics ’ of believers and the impact of
conversion on social practice and political values : ‘We need to ask what
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sort of representations of power, what sort of articulation of ‘‘civic virtue’’
are being constructed by the people, and to try to see what they might tell
us about the possibility of instituting the form of society which we might
represent as democratic ’ (Marshall 1995: 243). While Ellis and ter Haar
(2007: 395) voice a similar concern to take the religious ideas of Africans
seriously, representing the views of believers demands a focus on particu-
lar groups in particular places – wealthy business people, civil servants, or
informal artisans in national or regional contexts – rather than on generic
Africans. Trying to decipher how new religious engagement inﬂuences the
values of actual believers oﬀers an opportunity to look beyond the more
dramatic representations of African religious responses to neo-liberalism,
characterised as ‘post-political ’, and devoid of ‘an ideological agenda, a
social vision, a political program’ (Comaroﬀ & Comaroﬀ 1999: 292). Not
that the focus on the ‘ implicit politics ’ of believers is meant to suggest an
absence of spiritual motivation in religious practice ; it aims only to
examine how the spiritual impulses generated by the punishing economic
circumstances of globalisation and liberalisation have reshaped underlying
values and forms of agency, for good or for ill.
There are two issues to be investigated here. The ﬁrst relates to de-
ciphering the way in which participation in new religious movements
shapes economic and political ethics among informal economic actors,
and the second involves considering whether these movements have the
power to eﬀect lasting institutional change, rather than succumbing to
marginalisation, violence or hijack by more powerful social forces, in-
cluding opportunistic religious leaders, political elites and global political
forces. In other words, understanding the political implications of religious
movements in a context of rapid informalisation requires a focus ﬁrst on
how religious change inﬂuences processes of class formation and social
ethics at the popular level, and second, on the capacity of these changes to
transform wider power relations within society.
R E L I G I O N A N D E N T R E P R E N E U R S H I P I N N I G E R I A N
I N F O R M A L E N T E R P R I S E
At the level of the informal economy, the inﬂuence of religious movements
in Nigeria reveals a long history of economically productive tendencies
operating under the surface of the state. Prospects for the institutional-
isation of these processes seem less encouraging, given the feeble inﬂuence
of the struggling masses on wider structures of power and authority. As in-
dicated, the role of religious movements will be investigated in the context
of three enterprise clusters : a weaving cluster in the Yoruba Muslim town
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of Ilorin in south-western Nigeria, and two clusters producing shoes and
garments, respectively, in the Igbo Christian town of Aba in south-eastern
Nigeria.1 These informal enterprise clusters were originally selected for
their economic dynamism and apparently ethnic basis of organisation.
The role of religion in their development and contemporary expansion
was largely unanticipated.
Despite being made up of very small informal ﬁrms – averaging fewer
than ten workers in the Yoruba weaving cluster and fewer than ﬁve in the
two Igbo clusters – these activities have expanded dramatically since the
onset of Nigeria’s structural adjustment programme in 1986 (Meagher
2007b). In towns with a population of about 1 million inhabitants, the
Ilorin weaving cluster employed over 10,000 weavers in the 1990s, and the
Aba shoe and garment clusters employed 46,000 and 12,000 people, re-
spectively, by the year 2000, with a combined annual turnover on the
order of US$200 million in the Aba clusters alone. Yet the vast majority of
the ﬁrms remain informal ; they are unregistered, evade key taxes, and
contravene basic labour, factory and zoning regulations. The rapid ex-
pansion of these informal enterprise clusters in the context of formal
economic collapse and pervasive hardship suggests a potential for econ-
omic dynamism independent of the state that has raised new questions
about the wider political and economic implications of informal economic
governance in Africa.
Religion in the Ilorin weaving cluster
In the early development of these informal enterprise clusters, the eﬀective
coordination of expanding economic activities outside the framework of
the state has repeatedly drawn on religious frameworks to embed com-
mercial norms and relations of trust among producers and traders across a
growing range of ethnic communities. In fact, in both the Yoruba and the
Igbo cases, religion was central to the very formation of a cohesive ethnic
identity among participating producers. The Yoruba weaving cluster,
which developed about a century before colonialism, included weavers of
a variety of ethnic origins, including Yoruba, Fulani, Nupe, Hausa and
Igbirra, who became welded together under a Yoruba Muslim identity
based on use of the Yoruba language, the practice of Islam, and sub-
mission to the authority of the Emir of Ilorin (Meagher 2007b). Similarly,
the two Igbo enterprise clusters, which emerged in Aba in the late colonial
period, owed much of their success to eﬃcient ‘pan-Igbo’ institutions of
apprenticeship, credit and trade that arose from common adherence to
pre-colonial oracular religions, particularly the Aro oracle, which imposed
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widespread regulatory authority across an otherwise stateless array of
politically autonomous communities (Meagher 2006; Northrup 1978). As
Axel Harneit-Sievers (2006: 58) observed in his masterful history of Igbo
society, oracular religions ‘played a role in the establishment and upkeep
of networks that brought together the local elites of other politically
autonomous communities over considerable areas ’.
Religion has continued to shape processes of social and economic
change within these informal enterprise clusters, particularly after the
coming of colonialism. In particular, religious movements played a central
role in challenging, or restructuring, the economic dominance of founding
communities within the clusters. In the case of the Ilorin weaving cluster,
the activity was founded by migrants from the weaving towns of the
collapsing Oyo Empire in the early nineteenth century. These weaving
groups shifted to Ilorin, which was the rising Yoruba power of the time.
While weavers from other Yoruba as well as non-Yoruba ethnic com-
munities were integrated into the Ilorin weaving cluster over time, those
from old Oyo weaving town lineages maintained a position of dominance
in the activity. Their advantage was initially a product of accumulated
skills, contacts and capital, but was increasingly due to their dominant
position in the weavers guild, which was lineage-based, and accorded
leadership to those from old Oyo weaving lineages. However, colonialism
precipitated dramatic changes in the weaving business, demanding new
kinds of political and economic connections, new forms of access to
labour, new language and educational skills, and adaptation to new ma-
terials and changing market conditions. Resistance to Western education
among the Muslim establishment of the area, reinforced by the policies of
indirect rule (Ilorin was politically part of northern Nigeria where mission-
based education was discouraged), constrained the capacity of weavers to
adapt to some of the new market opportunities created by colonialism.
During the late colonial period, new Islamic movements created a
means of addressing some of these pressures. Key among them were the
expansion of the Quadiriyya and Tijjaniyya Suﬁ brotherhoods into mass
organisations during the 1950s, and the rise of modernising Islamic or-
ganisations such as Ansar Ud Deen, which came to Ilorin in the late
colonial period (Loimeier 2005). While Quadiriyya was the brotherhood of
the political establishment, and was preferred by the more established
weavers, especially those in the guild leadership, Tijjaniyya brotherhoods
appealed to those seeking advancement through commercial rather than
political channels. In addition to promoting an ethic of piety, parsimony
and discipline, Tijjaniyya encouraged a more accommodating attitude to
Western education. The popularised form of Tijjaniyya – known in
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Nigeria as Tijjaniyya-Ibrahimiyya – spread rapidly in Muslim commercial
centres such as Kano, and was popular among weavers of a modernising
orientation who were impatient with the constraints of the weavers’
guild. As Loimeier (2005: 354) observed, Tijjaniyya ‘became a network for
traders and entrepreneurs that saw their aﬃliation with the Tijaniyya-
Ibrahimiya as a channel to further their economic activities as a member
of a transnational religious network that could provide important political
and economic contacts, as well as spiritual protection’. Others with
modernising tendencies also gravitated toward Ansar Ud Deen, though
this society had a more middle-class orientation, and only attracted a
minority of weavers. At the time of my research in 2004–5, nearly one
third of weavers belonged to Tijjaniyya or Ansar Ud Deen, with the vast
majority in Tijjaniyya. Tijjaniyya members were signiﬁcantly over-
represented in primary and secondary education relative to members of
more mainstream Islamic groups, particularly among those born after the
1950s. Interestingly, Tijjaniyya members were also less likely to know their
ancestral origins than other weavers.
Religion in the Aba shoe and garment clusters
The Aba enterprise clusters revealed interesting variations in the re-
lationship between founding artisanal groups and new religious move-
ments. The Aba garment cluster was founded in the late colonial period by
migrants from the relatively prosperous farming and trading communities
of the former colonial district of Bende, in eastern Igboland. Bende in-
digenes had no pre-colonial specialisation in weaving or tailoring, but
during the colonial period became involved in cotton production and in
itinerant tailoring, bringing them into contact with the colonial garment
industry. The comparative prosperity of Bende indigenes facilitated their
entry into small-scale garment production, a mechanised activity with
comparatively high capital costs. These factors also supported a strong
orientation towards educational achievement within the garment cluster,
despite its informal sector status. In 2000, two thirds of garment producers
had secondary education, compared with just over one third in the Ilorin
weaving cluster (Meagher 2007b).
In contrast to the Ilorin weaving cluster, the prominence of the found-
ing artisanal community within the garment cluster was supported rather
than undermined by the ﬁrst wave of evangelical Christianity in the 1970s,
and by the subsequent wave of pentecostal Christianity in the 1990s. This
coincided with a period of expansion in the garment cluster, accompanied
by the entry of a wider range of other Igbo communities. Garment
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producers of Bende origins gravitated towards the new churches, which
encouraged an emphasis on skills, education and frugality, which were
conducive to maintaining Bende advantage in the activity. Religious
conversion also created a mechanism of solidarity for assimilating skill-
oriented producers from other Igbo communities into networks of soli-
darity and accumulation within the activity. At the time of my research,
70% of garment producers from Bende communities, and just under 50%
of producers in the garment cluster as a whole, belonged to evangelical
and pentecostal churches. The leader of the Bende-dominated informal
garment producers’ association was an evangelical pastor, and many
others were pastors or evangelical church elders. Membership in evan-
gelical and pentecostal churches provided a skill-oriented framework for
occupational solidarity, communal integration and accumulation. When
interviewing a non-Bende producer of men’s suits who had been in the
informal garment cluster since the 1970s, I asked him if his lack of Bende
origins was an impediment to advancement within the business. He
answered: ‘No, so many of them are in my church. ’ He himself was a
Jehovah Witness who had served three apprenticeships in garment pro-
duction in order to reﬁne his skills suﬃciently.
Aba’s informal shoe manufacturing cluster has a very diﬀerent social
and religious history. It developed as the specialisation of migrants from
the former colonial district of Mbaise, a poor, particularly land-scarce area
located in central Igboland. Mbaise migrants turned to informal shoe
production owing to its extremely low capital and skill threshold. This
initially involved the use of simple hand tools for the production of crude
sandals. Mbaise shoe producers had no artisanal history of shoe pro-
duction or leather working, and concentrated initially on producing san-
dals from old tyres. Over time, however, skills, equipment and materials
became more sophisticated, leading to the production of contemporary
‘ fashion shoes’. As informal shoe production expanded during the 1970s,
Mbaise dominance of the business was rapidly eroded by entrants from
other Igbo and even neighbouring non-Igbo communities, owing to the
low capital and skill levels of the majority of Mbaise producers. Despite
being the founding artisanal group, Mbaise producers rapidly dwindled to
a small proportion of informal producers owing to their lack of competi-
tive advantage, though some established Mbaise producers managed to
maintain a presence in the leadership of the shoe producers’ associations.
Regarded as a ‘poor man’s business ’, informal shoe production tended to
attract entrants who lacked the resources or training to enter something
better. Despite the entry of producers from more economically ad-
vantaged communities, shoe production was associated with signiﬁcantly
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lower levels of education than are observed in the garment cluster, and
even in the Ilorin weaving cluster. Barely 13% of informal shoe producers
had secondary school education.
Owing to the poor social backgrounds of informal shoe producers,
and their low levels of education and skills, conversion to evangelical
Christianity was much less common, particularly in the ﬁrst wave of
evangelical movements in the 1970s. Most shoe producers lacked the
economic security to risk alienating the political and religious establish-
ment of their home villages, and also lacked the requisite levels of literacy
and skill to advance themselves through evangelical Christian channels.
Among the original Mbaise producers, and shoe producers as a whole, the
vast majority remained members of the older established churches
(Catholic, Anglican, Presbyterian, Methodist), even after the second wave
of Christian revivalism in the 1990s. Even economically successful shoe
producers tended to cultivate status within the religious and political es-
tablishment of their home villages, rather than to gravitate towards new
religious movements. In contrast to the garment cluster, the most suc-
cessful group of shoe producers was dominated by those from trading
rather than artisanal backgrounds. Economic success was based on a
trading ethic of proﬁt and turnover rather than on a small industrialist
ethic of skills, education and reliability characteristic of high performing
garment producers. As a result, patrimonial rather than skill-based forms
of accumulation and class formation predominated in the shoe cluster.
Membership in new churches arose largely in the 1990s, involving pro-
ducers from more artisanally skilled and educated backgrounds who were
forced into the activity by economic hardship, or who joined prosperity
churches in the hope of linking into new networks of assistance.
By the end of the twentieth century, new religious movements had
considerably altered the social organisation of all three informal enterprise
clusters. As Table 1 shows, founding communal identities had dwindled in
importance, and new religious movements provided important mechan-
isms for occupational solidarity and economic advancement, particularly
in the weaving and garment clusters. Moreover, in both Muslim and
Christian areas, religious movements tended to act as modernising forces,
encouraging educational attainment, as well as facilitating relations of
trust and solidarity, not only with other sub-ethnic communities, but with
members of other ethnic groups. The one thing religious change does not
appear to have aﬀected is the gender division of labour, which continued
to exclude women from operating ﬁrms in both the weaving and the shoe
clusters, and which had always allowed signiﬁcant female participation in
the garment cluster.
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S T R U C T U R A L A D J U S T M E N T , I N F O R M A L I T Y A N D N E W
R E L I G I O U S M O V E M E N T S
While the role of new religious movements, both Muslim and Christian,
has followed a fairly clear modernising logic within these informal
enterprise clusters, their impact on informal enterprise performance and
class formation has been signiﬁcantly altered by the pressures of economic
restructuring and democratisation. Tendencies towards the development
of cohesive forces for popular entrepreneurship have become increasingly
fractious and fragmented in the face of eﬀorts from above to hijack re-
ligious movements for new purposes. In the process, productive processes
of class formation from below have been disrupted from above, with in-
creasingly problematic economic and political consequences.
The onset of Nigeria’s structural adjustment programme in 1986 sub-
jected informal producers to intense economic pressure. Between 1985 and
1999, the Nigerian currency lost 99% of its value, and urban dwellers
faced an average annual inﬂation rate of more than 200% (Meagher
forthcoming). Massive public and private sector retrenchment generated
serious unemployment, leading to a ﬂood of entrants into all manner of
informal activities. In Ilorin, more than half of existing weaving enterprises
have started up since the onset of structural adjustment, while in the two
Aba clusters, the overwhelming majority of producers have entered under
structural adjustment – with the result that more than half of them were
under thirty years of age in 1999. The competitive pressures unleashed
by rapid entry, often by young, undercapitalised and inadequately
trained producers from an increasingly wide variety of communal and
T A B L E 1


















Ilorin weaving 14 27 (8)* 39 0
Aba garment 44 48 0** 66 44
Aba shoe 14 37 6 13 0
Notes :
* One-third of weavers no longer knew their ethnic origins, and even those indicating non-Yoruba
origins had been assimilated into a Yoruba identity.
** There were a small number of non-Igbo southern minorities in the garment cluster, but none came
up in the sample.
Source : Fieldwork.
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socio-economic backgrounds, have created new tensions of identity, gen-
eration and occupational ethics. This has been accompanied by an ex-
plosion of religious revivalism, injecting a diversity of Christian and
Islamic movements into the mix. Amid this economic and religious fer-
ment, the three clusters have responded in distinctive ways.
Patrimonialism, modernisation and Islamic radicalism: what weavers want
The latest wave of Islamic reformism that has gripped Nigeria since
the 1980s has had comparatively little eﬀect on the Ilorin weaving cluster,
for a variety of reasons. The new revivalist phase involves a range of anti-
Suﬁ, fundamentalist movements, including Izala, the so-called Shi’ite
movements, and the forms of ‘political Islam’ behind the imposition of
shari’a law in many of the northern Nigerian states (Kane 2003; Loimeier
2005). While these movements have had a powerful impact in northern
Nigeria, they have comparatively little political or religious appeal
to Muslims in the Yoruba south-west. Yoruba communities, and even
families, are often religiously mixed, and more belligerent forms of Islam
are perceived as unnecessarily divisive. The new Islamic movements
that have generated a following in the south-west, such as NASFAT2 or
Quareeb,3 are largely Yoruba middle-class movements which emphasise
melding modernisation with Islamic lifestyles, rather than the creation of
an Islamic state. Their orientation towards high levels of education, the
use of English, modern media technology and an economic concern with
employment in the modern sector creates a milieu that would tend to
embarrass rather than to captivate artisans. Only two weavers out of a
sample of over ﬁfty were members of any of these new organisations. One,
who had secondary school education and used weaving to supplement his
civil service salary, was a member of Quareeb, while the other, a trader
who seemed to spend little time on weaving, belonged to a more marginal
Islamic society.
Given its comparative lack of appeal, the new wave of Islamic
reformism has had little eﬀect on Muslim–Christian relations in the weav-
ing cluster. Owing to the tendency to take on apprentices and labour from
surrounding Christian Yoruba and minority weaving communities, 40%
of weavers employed some Christian workers, and a tiny percentage even
employed women workers. Moreover, in the context of weakening mar-
kets, one area of expanding demand was the production of banners and
ceremonial wear for church celebrations. Sixty-seven percent of weavers
engaged in weaving contracts for churches. From the point of view of
weavers, the pentecostal revival was more a bonus than a threat.
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The real struggles unleashed within the weaving cluster took place
along the lines of the earlier processes of class formation set in motion in
the 1950s by the rise of Tijjaniyya brotherhoods. While markets for Ilorin
weaving initially expanded under structural adjustment, when imported
cloth became too expensive, demand has fallen dramatically since the late
1990s owing to economic hardship, the liberalisation of textile imports,
and intense competition triggered by unemployment and rapid entry into
the weaving business (Meagher 2007b). These pressures have exposed
emerging faultlines between the more conservative weavers who dominate
the weavers’ guild and represent the weaving profession to the state, and
more progressive weavers who tend to be younger, and to favour inno-
vation, education and the development of new markets rather than ad-
vancement through patronage ties.
This struggle has expressed itself in two ways. The ﬁrst and most dra-
matic has been a split in the weavers’ guild between the old guard and a
group of younger modernisers. In the old guard, power is concentrated
among senior, less educated weavers of Oyo weaving town origins, with
predominantly mainstream religious aﬃliations. The young modernisers
involve slightly younger weavers (in the gerontocratic context of Yoruba
society, ‘young’ means under ﬁfty), with limited education, more diverse
origins, and a more economically responsive and innovative approach to
weaving which has allowed them to outperform their seniors. The split in
the weavers’ guild took place in the early 1990s, in the context of a dispute
over the relocation of the main weaving market. Two important points for
the purposes of this discussion are that both groups appear to be domi-
nated by weavers who have been three or more generations in the busi-
ness, and that membership in Tijjaniyya is not important in either group.
The central point of contention appears to be a struggle for control over
the traditional weaving markets in the context of intense competition and
collapsing demand. Weavers have conventionally sold their wares in two
or three specialised periodic markets for indigenous cloth, located in the
towns of Ede, Ibadan and now Oyo, some distance from Ilorin. In the
past, Ilorin cloth was also traded to Ghana, Sierra Leone and other parts
of West Africa, but war and economic hardship have all but wiped out this
longer-distance trade, narrowing the main marketing networks to those
centred on the periodic weavers’ markets.
The old guard have tended to address their economic diﬃculties by
asserting their authority over the terms on which weavers can enter the
market, and by lobbying local politicians for contracts and assistance.
They themselves recognise that they are only showing an interest in pol-
itical links because demand for weaving is low, but the more they rely on
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politicians to solve their problems, the less they can aﬀord to criticise them.
They also reproach the young modernisers for exacerbating their mis-
fortunes by disturbing conventional marketing channels and refusing to
attend the annual prayers organised by the weavers’ guild, which has
broken the solidarity of weavers. While the old guard rely on traditional
patronage politics to address their problems, the young modernisers have
grown disillusioned with local patronage arrangements, which only seem
to take an interest in weavers at election time. The younger weavers
complain that local politicians refuse to see them when their represen-
tatives want to discuss the problems in the weaving business, but will come
at election time to ‘dash’ them N10,000 for ‘ soft drinks ’ and ask for their
vote. Eﬀorts to link up with Ilorin indigenes in high federal government
posts, or to attract the ear of the state through gifts or participation in
trade fairs, have all failed to turn markets around or to attract state at-
tention to their occupational concerns. A spokesman for the association of
the young modernisers declared that, after repeated eﬀorts and discussions
about what could be done about the decline of the weaving business, they
resolved that the only thing they could do was pray.
A second, less visible, process is unfolding at the level of those who
avoid political channels and concentrate on gaining access to new markets.
While the traditional marketing outlets are suﬀering from overcompetition
and declining demand, new marketing channels have opened up over the
past decade or so that demand new production and marketing skills. One
of these new channels involves the global trade in Ilorin cloth to members
of the West African and black diaspora in the USA and the UK. This
channel demands higher-quality production, rapid changes in fashion,
and doing business with middle-class operators who take cloth overseas,
rather than operating through the local cloth marketing system. Because
many of these overseas traders are Yoruba, many weavers have managed
to link up with this trade on at least an occasional basis. Indeed 64% of
weavers had at least some customers who engaged in this overseas trade.
However, it is worth noting that nearly 80% of Tijjaniyya members en-
gaged in this trade, compared to less than 60% of other weavers, and that
among those who did engage in this circuit, Tijjaniyya members had
considerably higher annual incomes than other weavers.
A second new channel involved trading to boutiques in Lagos and Port
Harcourt that catered to high society Nigerian customers. These estab-
lishments are often run by wealthy business people and ‘people in high
places ’ – it was even said that the wives of some Yoruba governors sell
Ilorin cloth through high-value channels. Even more than the overseas
markets, these high society markets demand high-quality materials, ﬁne
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craftsmanship, and reliable delivery. As one weaver explained, the main
worry of those competing in this market channel is not how to reduce the
price so that people will buy, as is the case in the regular cloth markets, but
how to increase quality and variety to satisfy a higher class of customer.
One informant maintained that the diﬀerence between those who sell to
boutiques in Lagos and Port Harcourt and those who sell in the traditional
cloth markets is education. Those who sell to boutiques have to deal with
customers who may not speak Yoruba, or may not wish to. But this same
informant sold primarily to boutiques himself, and only had a primary
school education, although he spoke excellent English, which was unusual
among weavers. He was distinctive in that he was young, came from a
weaving family with a strong emphasis on craftsmanship, placed a high
value on education and on thorough training in weaving and marketing
skills, and belonged to the Tijjaniyya brotherhood. This is only anec-
dotal – only a couple of traders in the sample traded to Lagos – but it does
suggest that Tijjaniyya continues to foster the kinds of ‘protestant ’ virtues
that facilitate economic eﬃciency and the formation of reliable commer-
cial networks in ways that tend to circumvent, rather than depend on,
patrimonial ties.
Unfortunately, the global ‘War on Terror ’ has begun to undermine
the global markets for Ilorin cloth. Weavers and cloth traders noted that
demand from overseas markets has been negatively aﬀected since
11 September 2001. Nigerian as well as ‘white ’ people who used to come to
buy Ilorin cloth for export now come much less, and some have stopped
altogether. A trader in the Ibadan cloth market was told by her overseas
customers that they faced greater problems getting visas to come to
Nigeria.
Pentecostalism and vigilantism: gaining the ear of the state
In contrast to the experience of Ilorin weavers, informal enterprise in Aba
has been dramatically aﬀected by the second wave of religious revivalism
in the 1980s and 1990s. The rapid proliferation of pentecostal churches has
been so marked in Abia State, in which Aba is located, that the state
licence plates bear the slogan ‘God’s Own State ’. This pentecostal en-
thusiasm is also reﬂected at the level of informal enterprise. In a sample of
132 producers across the two clusters, 27 diﬀerent denominations were
represented, involving 21 evangelical sects, 5 mainstream churches, and
1 Muslim convert (he said Christianity had become too much of a racket,
and he felt it was better to save his money and become a Muslim). As this
anecdote suggests, the spread of pentecostal conversion did not negatively
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aﬀect relations between Christians and Muslims at the popular level.
Hausa Muslim embroiderers, who were particularly skilled, were routinely
hired by informal garment ﬁrms. Many shoe producers specialised in a
type of shoe bought only by Muslim traders from the north, and one shoe
producer claimed that he would rather give credit to Hausa (Muslim)
customers than to Igbos, because the Hausa were more reliable in re-
paying.
As previously indicated, the impact of Christian revivalism was par-
ticularly pronounced among garment producers. Despite the rise of
‘prosperity ’ churches in the 1990s, pentecostalism in the garment cluster
continued to reﬂect an adherence to the earlier messages of holiness and
salvation associated with the preceding wave of evangelical Christianity.
As Maxwell (1998) and Marshall (1993) remind us, the earlier form of
Christian revivalism was originally a movement of artisans and other
toiling classes. As in the Muslim weaving cluster, the earlier phase of re-
ligious revival remained relevant among garment producers even after the
rise of new movements oriented to the less ascetic concerns of middle-class
and elite constituencies. The ‘other-worldly ’ message of strict pentecostal
churches, calling for asceticism, strict personal ethics and prayer, not only
strengthened the economic ethic that drove accumulation within the gar-
ment cluster ; it also helped producers to cope with the economic dep-
redations of structural adjustment.
As of the year 2000, roughly half of garment producers were members
of pentecostal churches, rising to nearly two thirds in the most successful
quartile. The majority of evangelical garment producers adhered to as-
cetic movements that required a complete break with tradition, which
eﬀectively disembedded them from conventional relations of solidarity.
This facilitated a conservation of resources by encouraging modesty in
dress as well as abstention from drinking and costly forms of socialising
common in Igbo society. More strikingly, adherents were also forbidden
to participate in their hometown association, which is viewed as a cultural
obligation among the Igbo. The objective was to dissociate themselves
from ‘sinners ’ who engaged in drinking and idol worship associated with
hometown socialising and ceremonial practices. In the process, producers
liberated themselves from the increasingly costly levies and contributions
required by their hometown associations in a time of declining state
funding and increased local political mobilisation. They also cut them-
selves oﬀ from the fallback of communal assistance, something only the
more skilled and industrious producers could risk. Concerns about de-
mons, exorcism and spiritual reprisals should be understood in the context
of the severe communal pressures brought to bear on those who attempted
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such a radical break. For those with the requisite levels of skill, discipline
and commitment, pentecostalism provided practical and spiritual sol-
utions to individual and social problems, contributing to ‘ the creation of
new identities and the articulation of strategies for survival and mobility ’
(Marshall 1993: 216).
By fostering an ethic of accumulation through skills and hard work,
pentecostalism represented an anti-patrimonial strategy of economic ad-
vancement. Disillusioned with the unreliability and corruption of patri-
monial networks, converts focused on ‘blasting away not only old values,
but old networks ’ (Mayer 1961). At the time of my research, the garment
cluster had close communal ties with the Abia State governor, who hap-
pened to come from one of the most inﬂuential Bende communities in the
cluster. Some of the older garment producers even knew the governor as a
boy, and had close ties with some of his senior relatives. Yet adherence to
the pentecostalist injunction to withdraw from participation in their
hometown associations was strongest among the most established Bende
garment producers, severing their strongest claim to patrimonial assist-
ance. The president of Aba Garment explained that informal linkages
through inﬂuential townsmen had not proven particularly helpful for
solving their real problems, and access to such people was unreliable.4 Far
from cosying up to government oﬃcials, the informal garment producers’
association tended to adopt an arms-length relationship with local and
state governments, and had even taken the federal government to court
over a case of oﬃcial harassment.
Instead, garment producers concentrated on building new networks
through business contacts, religious connections, and the pursuit of direct
access to formal institutional channels. Church-based links oﬀered access
to more productive and trustworthy labour, to business contacts who ob-
served strict moral codes, and to ﬂows of resources and information
through regional and global pentecostal networks. The garment pro-
ducers’ association also attempted to forge direct institutional links with rel-
evant organs of the state, rather than cultivating patrimonial channels of
access. Through the garment association, garment producers were mem-
bers of the Nigerian Association of Small-Scale Industrialists (NASSI), and
in 2000 were making eﬀorts to register their association with the Federal
Government so that they could lobby directly for controls on Asian textile
imports. However, these strategies had limited success in linking informal
garment producers into new networks of power, even after the expansion
of the pentecostal movement to attract middle-class and elite participants.
Even in the church, strategic resources and contacts tended to be mono-
polised by more powerful classes, while eﬀorts to link up directly with the
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formal sector and the state failed as the result of the informal status and
political marginality of producers in the garment cluster. Despite their
commitment to ‘ the spirit of capitalism’, informal garment producers are
languishing in the face of state neglect, Asian import competition and
infrastructural collapse.
In the shoe cluster, the new wave of pentecostalism has had a rather
diﬀerent impact. Despite a continued bias in favour of the established
churches, there has been a more signiﬁcant wave of conversion to pente-
costalism since the 1990s. As indicated above, 37% of shoe producers had
converted to pentecostal churches by 2000. This considerable level of
pentecostal participation was a product of fairly recent conversions, and
the entry into the shoe cluster of producers from a more diverse range of
communities and backgrounds. However, pentecostal converts in the shoe
cluster tended to adopt the more ‘entrepreneurial ’ forms of networking
characteristic of the ‘prosperity ’ churches, rather than the ascetic forms of
withdrawal from society characteristic of the earlier wave of Christian
revivalism (Ojo 2005: 400). Only 10% of producers in the shoe cluster
belonged to church groups that required withdrawal from their hometown
association. These ascetic Christians were concentrated among more
educated entrants and those from artisanal communities, most of whom
had been forced into the shoe cluster by adversity, and were not particu-
larly successful producers owing to their lack of capital. The majority of
pentecostal shoe producers converted in order to expand their social net-
works rather than to transform them. Eﬀorts in the 1990s to make
Nigerian pentecostal churches more ‘elite friendly’ (Adeboye 2005: 448),
and to forge links with Christian elites within the state, made these
churchesmore attractive to shoe producers, who saw conversion as a way to
form supportive ties with wealthier and better-placed members of society.
This tendency to see conversion as a means of cultivating additional net-
works of assistance led to the phenomenon known in Aba as ‘change your
church’, which was twice as common in the shoe cluster as it was in the
garment cluster. Changing one’s church refers both to conversion, and to
the tendency to shift from one pentecostal church to another looking for
the most conducive environment.
Both in their preference for the established churches, and in their
practice of pentecostal conversion, shoe producers revealed an orientation
towards patrimonial strategies of economic advancement. Given their
more marginalised social and economic backgrounds, low levels of edu-
cation and poor skills, the majority of shoe producers lacked the social
and human capital to adopt a strategy of dissolving old networks and
building new ones. The strategies of shoe producers and of their enterprise
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associations focused on embedding themselves more deeply in patrimonial
networks in Aba and in their home communities. Among the most suc-
cessful shoe producers, none had converted to pentecostal churches, all
were members of their hometown associations, and there was a strong
preference for membership in a range of social clubs which helped to link
them to the patronage of people of wealth and power through social events
and ceremonies to which dignitaries and patrons were invited – precisely
the sorts of dissipation of resources that the successful garment producers
avoided. The shoe cluster associations (there were six of them) all culti-
vated links with the local and state governments, and engaged in favours
and kickbacks that assisted accumulation among executives, but did little
to advance the cluster as a whole (Meagher 2006).
Ultimately, it was the shoe producers rather than the garment pro-
ducers who managed to capture the attention of the state. Despite the
powerful social impact of new religious movements in the garment cluster,
and the eﬀorts of the garment association to forge direct economic and
political links with relevant government institutions, garment producers
have remained marginalised and ignored by the state. In the shoe cluster,
religious entrepreneurship and the cultivation of patrimonial ties have
brought them occasional crumbs from the state, though these tend to be
monopolised at the top. It was only when the shoe producers formed a
notorious vigilante group known as the Bakassi Boys in the late 1990s that
they actually attracted any real state attention (HRW/CLEEN 2002;
Ukiwo 2002). Suddenly, the shoe producers controlled something with the
power to wield public authority beyond the sphere of the poor and the
powerless. While the objective of the vigilante group was initially to make
Aba safe for visiting traders from other parts of Nigeria and beyond who
came to buy shoes and other goods in Aba, it was rapidly hijacked by the
Abia State governor for attacks on local Muslims in early 2000 as a reprisal
for the killing of Igbos in anti-shari’a riots in northern Nigeria (Meagher
2007a). These attacks not only ran against the grain of local relations
between Christians and Muslims in Aba, but undermined accumulation in
both the shoe and the garment clusters by scaring away valuable Muslim
customers and workers for almost a year afterwards. Once the activities of
the vigilante group moved away from prevailing notions of justice and
accountability, references to occult powers and protective charms were
increasingly used to justify violations of conventional norms of law and
order. Occult idioms were thus used to override popular ethics, rather
than representing them, but local people were also adept at turning occult
idioms back on the vigilantes and their advocates by demanding empirical
demonstrations of their supernatural powers when abuses of authority
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became excessive (ibid.). Clearly, productive, patrimonial and occult ethics
all played a role in the spiritual impulses of these informal producers, but
in complex and textured ways not reducible to cultural propensities or
literal interpretations.
: : :
Within the context of Nigerian informal enterprise, there is clear evidence
that both Islamic and Christian religious movements have given rise to
distinctly Weberian ‘modernising tendencies ’, rather than being reducible
to ‘occult economies ’ or born-again patrimonialism (Kane 2003: 245; Ojo
2005: 397). But if they are to promote development and democracy,
modernising tendencies among the poor and the powerless must be sup-
ported by more powerful social groups or by the state. The opposite ap-
pears to be happening in Nigeria. Middle-class forces have increasingly
captured new religious movements in both Christianity and Islam for their
own economic and social objectives, limiting the potential of these move-
ments for the economic and political empowerment of the informalised
masses. Entrepreneurial religious leaders and political elites have also be-
gun to instrumentalise these movements in the service of pantomimes of
democratisation, cultivating links between new religious leaders and poli-
ticians to mobilise electoral support or to shift the balance in elite power
struggles. Even global forces have actively engaged in capturing or
thwarting religious networks for their own political ends. In this tangle of
political machinations, the fragile process of entrepreneurial class for-
mation within the informal economy has been all but lost.
Evidence from the Nigerian informal economy suggests that serious
consideration of how religious revivalism is shaping economic ethics and
political possibilities in Africa demands an awareness not only of new
forms of agency from below, but of existing modes of domination. The
modernising entrepreneurial ethic of Tijjaniyya and ascetic evangelical
protestantism has been increasingly marginalised by state neglect, and by
the economic and political instrumentalisation of new Christian and
Islamic movements, encouraging a rising tendency towards patrimonial
forms of religious engagement, even among informal artisans. As Terence
Ranger (1985) reminded us over two decades ago, religious movements
are not just political movements in disguise – something that some
recent commentators seem to have forgotten. Ranger cites John Waliggo’s
(cited ibid. : 52) comment that African popular movements have historically
represented a longing for change in a situation in which ‘ few can
really trigger change’. While they may give rise to new forms of social
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identiﬁcation and political consciousness, religious movements have a class
as well as a cultural dimension, and they are about powerlessness as much
as new forms of power.
In contemporary times as well, much depends on the way in which the
speciﬁc ‘ implicit politics ’ of popular religious activism links up with more
powerful social forces. This is especially true of movements that emerged
from the poor and aspiring middle classes in developing countries, whose
longing for change continues to outstrip their power to demand it. As
Ruth Marshall (1993: 242) observed in her analysis of Nigerian pente-
costalism, ‘what sort of lasting social and political impact such a challenge
may have is as yet unclear, and depends … to a large extent on the way
the movement becomes politicised, if at all ’. While processes of poli-
ticisation are very much in evidence in Nigerian Christian and Islamic
movements, their current trajectory is not encouraging from the perspec-
tive of popular economic and political transformation. The problem,
however, does not lie in the cultural orientation of indigenous religious
expression, but in its instrumentalisation by more powerful social, political
and global forces.
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